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Abstract. While the extant empirical literature on earnings management focuses on incentives, 
constraints  and  consequences  in  (US)  listed  companies,  we  present  results  on  nonlisted 
companies that operate in a continental European environment (Belgium); and we consider not 
just the effects of  internal mechanisms and external auditing but also of stakeholder relations. 
Methodologically, special care is taken of an errors-in-variables problem induced by the two-
step procedure. We find clear evidence that earnings are managed (downward) for tax purposes, 
but also that relationships with banks and suppliers  act as  a restraining  factor  in this  field. 
Another factor of  moderation of  downward manipulation appears to be a large board. Employee 
power does not seem to affect accruals management. Lastly, in our sample audit quality does 
not exhibit any statistically clear relation with the  auditor's visibility (for instance, big-N or 
not). Earnings quality in privately held firms: 
the roles of external audits, stakeholders, and governance mechanisms 
Introduction 
Concerns  about  the  quality  of reported  earnings  and  the  adequacy  of mechanisms  that  may 
constrain earnings  management have been around  since  long  before the  scandals  of the  early 
2000s.  In  the  late  80s  and  90s,  for  instance,  these  issues  were  already  on  the  agenda  of the 
corporate-governance task forces that sprang up  in  many  countries.  While  these  committees' 
initial  recommendations  mostly  bore  on  internal  governance  characteristics,  like  the 
composition  and  size  of the  board of directors, 1  more  recently  attention  was  shifted  towards 
the role that  external  auditors  play,  or should play,  in  the  provision  of high-quality  financial 
information. The same trend appears in recent empirical work:  it has  refocused  on  the  quality 
effects  of external auditing,  especially big-N versus  non big-N,  on reporting  by  Anglo-Saxon 
listed  companies.2  Our  paper  complements  the  extant  literature  in  many  directions.  We 
present  empirical  results  on  nonlisted  companies;  these  firms  operate  in  a  continental-
European environment (Belgium); and  we  consider not just the  restraining  effects  of external 
auditing  and  internal  mechanisms  but  also  of stakeholder  relations.  As  a  result,  many 
interesting issues crop up that are new or  have  at  least  received  comparatively  little  attention 
thus far. 
Nonlisted  companies  are  interesting  because  they  have  different  incentives  and 
constraints relative to  listed  ones.  For  small,  privately  held  companies  the  traditional  agency 
problems that dominate the Anglo-Saxon literature should be mitigated by,  on  the  equity  side, 
a  close  association  of ownership  and  control  and,  on  the  debt-fmancing  side,  relationship 
banking. Still, it  remains  an  empirical  issue  whether  and  to  what extent the  company's  board 
and the  house  bank  succeed  in  constraining  earnings  management,  and  whether  factors  like 
board size playa material role in this. Also, nonlisted companies, being smaller and not subject 
to the pressure from a stock market, may  be  more  sensitive  to  other  stakeholders  with  whom 
there is either an implicit contract (like  customers or  suppliers)  or even  an  explicit,  regulated 
relation  (employees,  trade  unions  sitting  in  the  works  council).  These  more  powerful 
incentives  to  practice  eamings  management  may  actually  go  hand  in  hand  with  ampler page 2  Earnings quality in privately held firms 
opportunities to do so. Because of their close association with  management,  the  firm's  owners 
and house bank can actually be briefed privately about the firm's financial  situation;  this  would 
then  give  the  company  more  room  to  use  the  financial  statements  as  an  ingredient  in  the 
relations with other  stakeholders.  To  external  auditors,  lastly,  whether  big-N  or  not,  the  fact 
that  the  customer  is  small  and  nonlisted  may  make  a  difference  too.  For  one  thing,  the 
likelihood that an audit failure  is  found  out  is  lower,  as  the  annual  reports  are  not pored  over 
by analysts or stock-market regulators. And the cost of being found  out is  also  smaller,  as  the 
customer  is  less  visible  to  the  public  and  an  audit  failure  likely  to  inflict  less  damage  to 
shareholders and auditors than it does in the case of a large, quoted corporation. 
Also  the  environment  of the  firms  considered  in  this  paper,  continental  European 
rather  than  Anglo-Saxon,  is  likely  to  make  a  difference.  We  have  already  mentioned  one 
utterly non-Anglo-Saxon entity, the works council, which must be briefed by the  managers  and 
auditors.  Another  characteristic  of the  European  setting  is  that  it  is  traditionally  far  less 
litigious,  a  feature  that  may,  again,  seriously  affect  the  motivation  of an  external  auditor. 
Corporate  financing  is  different,  too.  Listed  companies  represent  a  far  smaller  part  of 
economic  life  than in  the  UK  or  the  US.  In addition,  even  quoted  European firms  differ  less 
from  nonlisted  private  firms  than  from  listed  US  firms:  they  tend  to  have  relatively 
concentrated ownership and rely more on private debt (loans  from  shareholders  and  the  house 
bank) than  on  arm's-length borrowing  (bonds).  A  last  group  of country-specific  features  that 
make  a  difference  relative  to  the  standard  US-UK  setting  include  the  mandatory  nature  of 
published  financial  statements  and  of external  audits,  even  for  nonlisted  companies;  and  the 
non-separation  between  the  income  statements  for  tax  purposes  and  for  reporting  to  the 
share- and debtholders, exacerbated by the absence of  consolidation for tax purposes. 
We  study  a  large  sample  of Belgian  closely-held  companies  and  find  compelling 
evidence that earnings  (i.e.  discretionary  accruals)  are  managed  for  tax  purposes.  However,  it 
turns  out that the  relationships  with  banks  and  suppliers  act  clearly  as  restraining  factors  in 
this field. Another factor of moderation of  downward manipulation appears to be a large board. 
Employee  power  does  not seem  to  affect  accruals  management.  Lastly,  in  our  sample  audit 
quality  does  not  exhibit  any  statistically  clear  relation  with  the  auditor's  visibility  (for 
instance, big-N or not). Earnings quality in privately held firms  page.3. 
The remainder of  the paper is organised as follows. We first provide a brief description 
of the Belgian reporting and auditing environment. In  Section 2  we  then  develop  our research 
hypotheses re incentives for and constraints on earnings management in privately held Belgian 
companies. Section 3 presents our specification of  the variables and the regressions. We  report 
our sample selection procedure and descriptive statistics  in  Section 4.  Our major results,  along 
with some sensitivity checks, follow in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
1.  The nature of  reporting and auditing in Belgium 
Some ofthe.institutional elements  mentioned  in  the  introduction  have  profound  implications 
for  the  demand and supply of reporting  and auditing  in  Belgium.  The  tradition  of dominant 
shareholders  and  relationship  banking,  even  among  listed  firms,  means  that  the  desire  to 
monitor management  was  historically  not  a  major source  of demand  for  financial  statements 
and  audits  in Belgium.  However,  one  obviously needs  an  income  statement  for  tax  purposes; 
and,  in  the  traditional  European  view,  also  employees  are  entitled  to  adequate  information 
about the firm. Thus, the production of financial  statements  has  become  mandatory:  all  firms 
in Belgium, whether publicly or privately held, that meet certain criteria on legal form and size 
must  publish  annual  statements,  and  present  these  not  just  to  the  general  assemby  of 
shareholders but also to the works council. In addition, they must file financial statements  with 
the  Belgian National  Bank,  where  any  interested  party  can  look  them  up?  That  logic  also 
extends  to  external  auditing:  it  is  mandatory  for  all  (public  and  private)  companies  as  of a 
certain size. 
This, then, has implications for concentration of the market for auditing services.  The 
large number of firms  to  be  audited,  many  of them SMEs,  creates  a natural  niche  for  smaller 
local  auditing  firms.  The  mandatory nature  of auditing  may  also  lessen  the  customers'  desire 
for a high-quality audit report; and this, in  turn, may reduce  demand for  big-N services  (if and 
to  the  extend  that  these  do  deliver  better  reviews-an empirical  issue  to  which  we  return). 
Whatever the reason, in 2000 the big-5 audit firms  served  less  than  50%  of the  companies  to 
be audited, against over 90 % in the US. Statistically, that feature should increase  the  power of 
any test for big-N-related quality differences. page 4  Earnings quality in privately held firms 
Still with respect to audit environment, another notable difference between the  US  and 
Belgimn is the de facto lack of  auditor  litigation in Belgimn.  Since  the  creation  of the  Belgian 
Kingdom in 1831, only eight cases against external auditors have been tried (Aerts  2002).  In a 
litigious environment the threat of  being sued works.as a deterrent against below-standard audit 
quality.  When  such  a  threat  is  absent  the  auditor  may  be  more  likely  to  succumb  to  the 
temptation  of preserving  a  friendly  relationship  with  hislher  client  in order  to  safeguard  the 
appointment, and thus be less inclined to constrain earnings management.4 
We have already mentioned the lack of separation  of statements  for  fiscal  purposes  v 
for  external  reporting,  and  the  absence  of  consolidation  for  tax  purposes,  as  relevant 
institutional features.  The  implications  are  obvious.  A  last  regulatory  detail  that  needs  to  be 
explained is the works council, another example of  European regulation to  protect  employees. 
Such a council  is  required  for  companies  with  more  than  100  employees.  The  Board  of 
Directors must provide the works council with company  information  over  and  beyond  what  is 
contained  in  the  standard  financial  statements,  and  the  statutory  auditor  is  required  to  attest 
and explain that information. 
2.  Hypotheses 
Earnings  management  is  the  result  of an  interaction  between  preparers  and  users  of the 
financial statements, and of  some governance mechanisms. In this section we elaborate on  two 
groups  of determinants  of earnings  management  (Le.  discretionary  accruals  management)  in 
privately held firms, namely incentives and restraining factors . 
• Hypotheses  about  incentives  are  unidirectional  in  sign,  but  the  predicted  size  probably 
depends on  the  sign  of discretionary  accruals  (DAC).  For  instance,  the  tax  incentive  is  to 
correct earnings downward under all circumstances, whether the other incentives point in  the 
same  direction  or  not,  and  whether  the  overall  correction  turns  out  to  be  down  or  up. 
Nevertheless,  one  would  expect  a  "don't overdo  it"  effect:  a  tax-related  urge  to  correct 
downward, for  instance,  should be weaker when income  is  already being decreased for  other 
reasons (i.e.  when DAC < 0) than  when there  are,  by  and large,  reasons  to  increase earnings 
(i.e.  when DAC >  0).  One  motivation  for  such  a  "don't  overdo  it"  effect  may  be  fear  of 
detection, for instance by the  tax  authorities.  Also,  when  too  many  incentives  point  in  the Earnings quality in privately held firms  page 5  . 
same direction, the company risks running out of  earnings-management tricks, in  which case 
the effect of any particular incentive on DAC would again be empirically smaller. 
• Restraining factors, in contrast,  tend  to  work  towards  zero  rather  than  being  W1idirectional; 
for  example,  a  good  auditor  is  expected  to.  curb  both  upward  and  downward  earnings 
management.5 
Table 1 provides an overview of the hypotheses. Among the  restraining  factors,  Table 
distinguishes  stakeholders- and  governance-related  ones.  Incentives,  in  contrast,  are  purely 
stakeholder-related. Many entries in that table  are self-evident.  Thus,  our discussion, below,  is 
confined to the less obvious items and to references to the literature. 
Table 1. Overview of  hypotheses 
Regarding the  stakeholder-related  incentives,  Trueman  and  Titman  (1988)  merely 
predict higher levels  of earnings  management,  whether  income-increasing  or  -decreasing,  in 
companies that depend to a higher extent on  financiers,  suppliers  and  employees.  Others  (e.g. 
Bowen et al.,  1995;  Burgstahler  and  Dichev,  1997;  Liberty  and  Zimmerman,  1986)  predict 
specific  directions:  they  expect  more  income-increasing  earnings  management  for  firms  that 
rely  more  on  external  financiers,  need  additional  external  finance  and  suppliers,  and  more 
income-decreasing  earnings  management  for  firms  that  depend  more  on  employees.  Our 
hypotheses in Table 1 adopt that second, direction-specific approach. 
The opposite idea-stakeholders acting as monitors and, thus, dampening  any  earnings 
management-has deep roots  in  the  finance  literature:  debt  generally  imposes  discipline  onto 
management  (Gul  and  Tsui,  1998,  p.  222;  Rubin,  1990;  Jensen  1986,  1989;  Stulz,  1990; 
Maloney  et al.,  1993,  Ang  et aI.,  2000,  p.  88),  and  especially  banks  monitor customers  that 
have  no  credit  reputation  (Diamond,  1991).  We  extend  that  logic  to  vendor  financing  and 
employee power:  the  fear  that  suppliers  or  the  works  council  catch  management bending  the 
rules may act as a restraining factor. 
We  now  turn  to  the  internal  and  external  governance  mechanisms.  The  primary 
responsibility  towards  stakeholders  regarding  the  quality  and fairness  of the  information  in  a 
firm's  fmancial  statements  rests  with  the  firm's  management,  or  more  specifically  with  its 
board of  directors. Evidence  on  what  board  characteristics  appear  to  affect  reporting  practice 
is  scarce,  mixed,  and  confined to  listed firms.  Dechow  et  al.  (1996)  examine  the  impact  of page 6  Earnings quality in privately held firms 
various board characteristics on the likelihood of  earnings overstatements (signalled by an  SEC 
enforcement release) and do not find any significant association with board size.  Beasley et al. 
(1996) investigate the association between board characteristics and the likelihood  of financial 
statement fraud, and find evidence of  a weak association between board size· and the  likelihood 
of fraud.  Peasnell  et  at.  (2000,  1999)  examine  the  impact  of board  quality  on  earnings 
management through discretionary accruals. They look at the role of outside  directors  and the 
audit  committee,  and  fmd  that  board  composition  is  the  major  factor  influencing  earnings 
management, regardless of  board size or the existence of  an audit committee. 
We focus on the impact of  board size. Our motivation for excluding board composition 
is  that,  in  privately  held  companies,  shareholders  do  not  need  independent  directors  to 
counterbalance  the  managers:  the  shareholders  are the managers,  or are  at least very  closely 
associated with them. Consistent with this, we find that our privately held firms  rarely  appoint 
outside and independent directors to the board. 
As to the  type  of relation  between  board size  and  board  effectiveness,  there  seems  to 
be a consensus  in favour  of an  interior  optimum  (see,  for  example,  Jensen  1993;  Lipton  and 
Lorsch,  1992).  A minimum number of board  members is  necessary for  the  board  to  cover  a 
sufficient  range  of monitoring  abilities.  However,  boards  that  are  too  large  may  become 
ineffective:  in  the  end,  the  increase  in  expertise  brought  by  an  additional  board  member  is 
more than offset by communication problems. The optimal board size presumably depends  on 
various  firm characteristics  and  is  difficult  to  pin  down.6 However,  for  small  privately  held 
companies one would not expect that a wide range of expertise is needed.  Consistent  with  this, 
our sample companies typically only have a few board members: three is the  (very  prominent) 
mode, and less than 20 percent of our firms have more than four. On the other hand,  very few 
companies  have  less  than  three  members  on  the  board;  thus,  for  all  practical  purposes  the 
upward-sloping  section  of the  performance  curve  (the  domain  below  three)  is  simply  not 
present in the sample. 
The  last  entry  in  Table  1  relates  to  external  auditing.  External  auditors  attest  the 
credibility of  firms' financial statements and  also  have  a legal  responsibility,  albeit  secondary, 
towards stakeholders regarding the quality and fairness of  the information  in  those  statements. 
Therefore,  it  is  interesting  to  assess  the  impact  of  external  audit  quality  on  eamings 
management. 7  Most  empirical  auditing  studies  hypothesise  that  big-N  auditors  are  higher-Earnings qua  lily in privalely held firms  page 7  . 
quality  auditors  than non-big-N  auditors:8  larger  audit  firms  have  more  to  lose-quasi rents 
(DeAngelo,  1981)  or  brand-name  reputation  (Klein  and  Leffler,  1981)-when  audit  failure 
occurs. Francis  et at.  (1999)  and  Becker  et  al.  (1998)  provide  evidence  that  big-6  auditors 
constrain  earnings  management  more  than  other. auditors,  at least  in  publicly  held  American 
firms. 
3.  Specification of  variables and regressions. 
3.1. Methodological issues 
From the above, we need to be  able  to  estimate  different  regression coefficients  depending  on 
whether  earnings  management  was  upward  and  downward.  This  means  that  we  must  do  the 
empirical  work  in two  steps.  First,  accrued  earnings  are  decomposed,  via  regression,  into  a 
normal part and a residual one. The normal component estimates the accruals that the  average 
firm with the sarne characteristics would have shown; the residual,  therefore,  is  our measure  of 
discretionary  accruals  (DAC).  Because this  step is  of tangential  interest  only  and  breaks  the 
flow, we merely mention that we use a Jones (1991)-Kasznik (1999) regression, expanded  with 
lagged accruals as an additional regressor. Further details are relegated to the Appendix. 
where 
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The switch regression can be estimated by  forming  separate  samples  for  positive  and  negative 
DACs,  and  using  joint  ("seemingly  unrelated")  regression.  The  regressors  themselves  are 
defined as in Table 2, below, and are discussed in Section 3.2. 
There are, however, several methodologicaJ"barbs  associated  with  (1).  Note,  first,  that 
the  switching  is  based  on  the  entire  left-hand-side  variable  (DAC),  not  on  the  basis  of 
E(DACiX), the regression line itself-that is, the part of  the  accruals  valuation  decision  that  is 
explicitly modelled in the  regression.  The  economic  motivation  for  switching  on  the  basis  of 
DAC not E(DACiX) is that, in principle, we interpret the regression "error" not as  meaningless 
noise but as the result of management's  conscious  decisions.  The  fact  that  these  decisions  are 
reactions to circumstances  too  diverse  to  be  modelled  explicitly  does  not  mean  that  they  are 
less  meaningful  than  the  ones  that  are  modeled  explicitly.  Statistically,  however,  this  way of 
characterising  the  switch process  creates  a peculiar problem  for  the  observations  with  fitted 
values  around  zero.  For  instance,  in  the  positive-DAC  sample  only  the  observations  with 
realised values above  zero  (i.e.  the  ones  with  sufficiently  large  regression  errors)  are  retained, 
which makes the error sampling process a-select. The implication of  this  feature  of (1)  is  that 
we  should use  truncated regression  rather  than  OLS.  There  is,  however,  another  problem 
associated  with  the  DAC-based  switch  process:  the  DAC regressand  generated  in  step  1  is 
measured with error.  This  means  that  there  is  a misclassification  problem:  some  observations 
that we deem to be positive earnings  adjustments  in  reality  are  downward corrections  and  vice 
versa. This problem is, of course, not solved with truncated regression. We try to deal  with  the 
twin  issues  in  two  ways.  In  a  first  approach  we  simply  use  OLS  and  argue  that  for  all 
coefficients but one  the  resulting  estimation bias  is  towards  zero,  that  is,  against  acceptance; 
this  makes  the  significance  statements  conservative.  Alternatively,  we  get  rid  of  the 
troublesome  DAC-observations  around  zero  and  focus  on  the  extreme  ones.  We  discuss  each 
solution in tum. 
In  the  full-sample  OLS  estimates, using  OLS  instead of truncated regression creates  a 
bias towards zero because, as  shown in Figure  1,  in the  X-zone where truncation  matters  the 
surviving regression errors are negatively (positively) correlated with X when the  true  slope  is 
positive  (negative).  As  a  result  of the  bias  towards  zero,  any  significance  statement  is 
conservative.  Regarding  misciassification,  the  normal  effect  is  that  the  computed  regression 
coefficient is a mixture of the slopes  in  each  of the  sub-populations.9  It turns  out  that  for  all Earnings quality in privately held firms  page 9 
test variables but one-l(TAX)-the prima facie significant coefficient  is  in  the  negative-DAC 
sample, with the  corresponding  slope  from  the  positive-DAC sample  smaller in  both  absolute 
and statistical terms.  Thus,  for  all  variables  except l(TAX),  the  significant  coefficient  for  the 
negative-DAC  sample  was  biased  towards  zero,  which  again  makes  significance  inferrals 
conservative. True, in the positive-DAC sample misc1assification must then have created  some 
bias away from zero; but as no slope, apart from l(TAX), is significant, any such bias would not 
affect the conclusions. Thus, the  only  problem variable  is  l(TAX),  where  part  of the  negative 
coefficient  in  the  negative-DAC  sample  may  have  been  due  to  a  rub-off  effect,  via 
misc1assification, from the positive-DAC population. 
Figure 1: The effect of Truncation on the error structure 
In  our  alternative  attempt  to  deal  with  the  combined  truncationlmisc1assification 
problem, we  add  two  more  steps  to  the  above  procedure.  In step  3,  we  compute  fitted  values 
from  (I),  rank  observations  on  the  basis  of  these  fitted  values,  and  retain  only  the 
observations  corresponding  to  the  top  and  bottom  25%  D.A Cs.  The  purpose  of dropping  the 
middle  50%  data  is  to  eliminate  most  of  the  observations  that  could  be  truncated  or 
misclassified, even if  in the  process  many  correctly-signed  data  get  dumped  too.  Importantly, 
however, the selection is  not done  on  the  basis  of DAC itself but on  the  basis  of some  linear 
combination  of regressors,  thus  avoiding  any  induced  non-random  sampling  of regression 
errors.lO  Having  side-stepped  the  selection-criterion  issue  and  (most  of)  the  misc1assification 
problem, we lastly rerun (1) on  just the  extreme-DAC sample.  The  simplicity  of this  solution 
comes  at  the  cost of a loss of power because the  range  of the regressors  is  narrower and  the 
number of observations is down. 
3.2. Regressors and Hypotheses. 
The  variables  themselves  are  defmed  in  Table  2,  along  with  the  signs  predicted  by  the 
hypothesis or by the  competing  hypotheses.  Again,  most  entries  are  self-explanatory  so  that 
our discussion, below, is  confined to  a few  finer  points.  If there  is  a  monitoring  hypothesis 
about a variable, its prediction is less action at either sign, i.e.  A < 0, K > O. 
Table 2:  Model specification and variable measurement 
Taxes.  While  we  do  not  know whether  firms  have  sufficient  tax-loss  carry-forwards  to  avoid 
taxation in year t prior to massaging the  earnings figure,  we  do  know  whether they paid taxes page 10  Earnings quality in  privately held firms 
in year t-1. If tax was paid,  there  surely is  no  tax-loss  carry  forward this year;  if no tax  was 
paid,  there  almost  surely  is  a  carry-forward  (albeit  of uncertain  size).  The  indicator  (or 
dummy) variable J(TAXi,t) is set equal to  unity  iff the  firm  did pay taxes  last  year.  Thus,  that 
variable  should  be  associated  with  income-decreasing  action,  but  less  so  when  other 
considerations  already  point  towards  lowered  profits  (that  is,  when  DAC~O).  In  short,  the 
"don't overdo it" logic predicts ).,<K<O. 
Employee  stakeholders.  We  report  coefficients  for  the  indicator  J(100Empl)  signalling  that 
there  must  be  a  works  council.  Under the  incentive  hypothesis  (to  stave  off wage hikes)  the 
existence of a works council prompts the firm to decrease earnings under all circumstances,  but 
less so when other considerations already point towards lowered profits (that is, when DAC~O). 
Thus, we again expect ).,<K<O. 
Supplier stakeholders. The variable is AlP scaled by total assets at the beginning of the  period, 
APuITAi,t-}. Under the  incentives  hypothesis,  management  wants  to  obtain  attractive  credit 
terms by boosting  earnings, and but less so  when  other  considerations  already  point  towards 
increased profits (that is, when DAC>O). Thus, the hypothesis is K>A>O. 
Bank  stakeholders.  The  importance  of good  relations  with  the  house  bank is  proxied  for  by 
Financial Debt scaled by lagged total assets, FinDu/TAi,t_], and by an indicator that a new loan 
is being taken up next year, J(M'inDi,t)=1.  The  logic  is  the  same as  for  suppliers  relations,  so 
the prediction is 1(>A>0. 
Board Size.  Ln(BSizei,t) is the natural  logarithm  of the  number of directors  on  the  board.  We 
prefer the  logarithm  of the  number  of directors,  as  a plot of the  discretionary  accruals  of a 
given sign against board size flattens out. A large board could mean  inefficient  monitoring  and, 
therefore, A>O,  K<O;  or it could mean more expertise, in which case we should see ).,<0, K>O. 
Big-6 auditor is indicated by J(Big6i,t)=1. Conventional wisdom and US  evidence suggests that 
its effect is to moderate all forms of  earnings management (i.e.  ),,<0, K>O). 
Control  variables  (1):  transactions  with related  companies.  If the firm  is  part  of group  (i.e. 
J(GROUPi,t)=I),  then  opportunistic  transfer  pricing  is  more  likely  in,  a  priori,  either 
direction: A>O,  K<O. 
Control  variables  (2):  operating  cash flow  and earnings.  We further include  cash  flow  from 
operations  (OCFi,tfTAi,t_})  and  earnings before  taxes (EARNUITAU_}),  both  scaled by lagged Earnings quality in  privately held firms  page 11 
total  assets,  to  control  for  potential  misspecification  that  may  occur  in  tests  of earnings 
management  for  firms  with  extreme  financial  performance  (Dechow  et al.  1995).  Prior 
research  (Dechow et al.  1995)  obtained  a  negative  coefficient  on  operating  cash  flow  and  a 
positive coefficient on earnings. 
4.  Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
Table 3 gives an overview of  the sample selection procedure  for  the  event  sample  that  we use 
to  test  the  explanatory  model  in  equation  (1).  Firms  in  our  population  have  to  satisfy  the 
following criteria: (i) submit full financial statements,  (ii) have  these  statements  audited  by an 
auditor and (iii) be an  industrial  or commercial  company  (NACE  codes  0-7)11,  in  an  industry 
that has at least 100  companies  in each of the  sample years,  so  that  at least  50  are  available 
for  estimation  of the  DAC regressions,  and  50 for  testing.  We identify  our  population  from 
the  Belfirst  CD-ROM,  June  1999.  Our  analysis  bears  on  the  period  1994-6.  Of  the  about 
18,000 observations in  the  population,  a  random  event  sample  of over  3000  candidate  firm-
years was selected to test the main hypothesis, while the  about  15,000  remaining  observations 
were used for estimation of  discretionary accruals. 
Table 3: Sample Selection Procedure 
From  the  over  3000  resulting  observations  we  further  deleted  (i)  firm-years  for  which  the 
auditor could not be identified or where the firm changed auditors  (there  is  evidence  that  firms 
have negative discretionary accruals in the last year with the original auditor; see, for  example, 
DeFond and  Subramanyam  1998);  (ii)  observations  that  bore  on  listed  companies;  (iii)  firm-
years  with  missing data for  the  variables  in  our  accruals  expectations  model  or  explanatory 
model,  occasionally  including  some  lagged  variables,  like  TAU-i, and leading  financial  debt 
number used in MinD;,t. Table 4 gives a breakdown of  our sample by industry. 
Table  5  presents  the  descriptive  statistics  for  our  sample.  It  shows  that  income-
decreasing  earnings  management  is  somewhat  more  prevalent  (54.3  percent)  than  income-
increasing action. The mean (median)  absolute  level  of discretionary accruals  (IDACI)  is  about 
4.9 (3.1) percent of  lagged total assets. 37 percent of  our firm-year observations are audited by 
big-6 auditors. This is fairly consistent with  the  anecdotal  evidence  on  the  market  shares  held 
by big-6  and  other auditors  in  the  private  client  segment of the  Belgian  audit  market.  Mean page I2  Earnings quality in privately held firms 
(median)  amount  of financial  debt  is  17.32  (10.25)  percent  of total  assets.  For  almost  48 
percent  of the  sample  firm-year  observations,  there  was  an  increase  in  financial  debt  in  the 
year  after  consideration.  Mean  (median)  trade  credit  is  over  28  (24)  percent  of total  assets. 
Trade credit is a more prevalent source  of external.finance  than  financial  debt.  28  percent  of 
our sample  firm-years  have  more  than  100  employees  and thus  should have  a  works  counciL 
71  percent of our sample firm-years  paid taxes  in  the  prior year,  and have  no  tax-loss  carry-
forwards.  More  than  50  percent  of our sample  firms  have  boards  of 3  or less  members.  73 
percent  of  the  firm-year  observations  report  that  they  have  financial  assets  in  or  have 
accounts receivables from or debt to an affiliated company, and hence are considered to  belong 
to  a  group.  Mean  (median)  cash  flow  amounts  to  over  7.79  (6.67)  percent  of lagged  total 
assets. Mean (median) earnings, lastly, are about 5 (2.86) percent of lagged total assets. 
Table 4: Industry classification of  firm-year observations 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics on the variables of our explanatory model 
5.  Empirical Results 
Table  6  reports  our  empirical  results  on  the  incentives  for  and  constraints  on  earnings 
management in privately held firms. Columns 2-3 present the coefficients and p-values for  the 
negative-DAC subsample, columns 4-5 for the positive-DAC subsample and columns 6-7 the  p-
values  for  differences  in  the  coefficient estimates  between both  subsamples.  The  t- or  F-test 
statistics  are  based  on  the  White  heteroskedasticity-consistent  covariance  matrix  (White, 
1980).  The overall  F-value  and  adjusted R2  (55.29  percent)  are  significant.  The  correlation 
matrix in Table 7 does not indicate any severe multicollinearity problems. 
In our discussion we will focus  mostly  on  the  full-sample  estimates,  except  for  J(TAX) 
where,  for  reasons  noted  above,  significance  inferences  from  the  full-sample  results  are  not 
reliable. 12  We  first  discuss  the  two  possible  motives  for  downward  earnings  manipulation: 
taxes,  and wage negotiations.  We then  proceed  with  the  remaining  stakeholders:  bankers  and 
suppliers. 
Table 6: Results from the full sample (N=1302) 
Table 7:  Correlation matrix for explanatory variables in our basic model Earnings quality in privately held firms  page 13  . 
•  Taxes.  In  Table  6  we  report  a  significantly  negative  coefficient  on  J(TAX)  for  negative 
DACs,  an  even  more  negative  (and  significant)  coefficient  for  positive  DACs,  and  a 
significant  difference  between the  two;  but,  as  noted  before,  the  misclassification  problem 
makes  the  negative-DAC  estimate  suspect.  Fortunately,  in  Table  8,  the  result  from  the 
extreme-DAC sample  is  that  both  coefficients  remain negative  and  statistically  clear,  even 
though their difference is no  longer  significant.  The  conclusion is  that if a firm  is  in  a tax-
paying  position,  then  its  upward  corrections,  if any,  are  clearly  toned  down  relative  to  a 
non-tax-paying firm. Likewise,  if the  firm ends  up  with,  on balance,  downward  corrections, 
there again  is  a  clear tax-related  component.  All  this  conforms  with  the  predictions  of the 
tax incentive hypothesis. 
•  Works  council.  Table  6  further  shows  that  the  estimated  coefficients  on  the  variable 
J(IOOEmpl) are not significant, whether in  the  negative- or in the  positive-DAC subsample. 
When we  use,  instead of J(lOOEmpl), the  log  of the  number  of employees  we  obtain  the 
same  non-result.  Thus,  there  is  no  evidence  that  earnings  are  manipulated  downward  to 
prevent wage-hike  demands.  Nor  is  there  any  indication  that  the  works  council  acts  as  a 
monitor, prompting management to go easy on earnings management. 
• Financing  stakeholders.  As  reported  in  Table  6,  we  find  that  the  coefficients  for  the 
variables FinDITA, M'inD  and APITA  are  very  significantly  positive  in  the  negative-DAC 
subsample.  In the  positive-DAC sample,  in  contrast,  all  coefficients  are  insignificant.  Not 
surprisingly,  then,  for  two  of the  variables,  namely  FinDITA  and  APITA,  the  difference 
between  the  coefficients  of  the  negative- and  positive-DAC subsamples  is  significantly 
negative. This does not fit in with the monitoring hypothesis: in that  case  one  would expect 
pressure to moderate especially  increases  and,  perhaps,  decreases.  Rather,  the  picture  is  one 
of  incentive-based management. When the firm is  decreasing its  earnings-because of taxes, 
for  instance--these decreases  are  clearly toned  down  when the  firm  needs  to  make  a  good 
impression on its banker or suppliers. But, in don't-overdo style, when the  firm  already  is  in 
an  earnings-increasing  mode  for  some  other reason,  then  pleasing  the  banker  and  suppliers 
does not seem to be a noticeable concern. 
We now tum to the governance-related mechanisms: board size, and big-6 auditor: 
• Board size.  Do  larger boards  have  more  expertise  at  detecting  earnings  management,  or  do 
they simply lose efficiency, or does the number  of directors  hardly  matter for  this  purpose? page 14  Earnings quality in  privately held firms 
The  answer  seems  to  be  that  it  depends  on  the  situation.  The  coefficient  estimate  for  the 
income-decreasing  subs ample  is  significantly  positive.  That  is,  the  level  of  income-
decreasing  earnings  management  is  definitely  more  moderate  when  the  board  is  large.  In 
contrast, for the positive-DAC subsample the  coefficient  is  insignificantly  negative;  and  the 
test  on  the  difference  between  the  positive- and  negative-DAC  samples  confirms  that  the 
board-size  effects  do  differ.  In  short,  there  is  no  clear  evidence  of a  moderating  influence 
under all  circumstances,  a normal  sign  of a monitoring effect.  But  as  the  board  cannot  be 
associated  with  an  incentive  to  manage  earnings  upward,13  our  diagnosis  still  is  that 
monitoring  does  happen  when  the  unrestrained  DAC  would  have  otherwise  been  very 
negative  . 
• Big-6  auditor.  Table  6  indicates  that  none  of the  coefficients  associated  with  the  Big6 
dummy  are  significant.  As  this  contradicts  the  extant  evidence,  we  have  added  extensive 
robustness tests,  experimenting  with  other potential  indicators  of quality  such  as  size-also 
local  firms  can be large- or  being  in  the  top-5  sizewise,  and  with  interactions  between 
J(Big6) and various measures of the customer's financial risk, but to no avail. 
Lastly, we  discuss the  results  on  the  control  variables.  The  coefficients  associated  with  the 
group-membership dummy are significant  and  point  towards  more  manipulation:  the  slope  in 
the  negative-DAC  sample  is  clearly  negative,  the  one  in  the  positive-DAC  sample  clearly 
positive,  and  the  difference  between  the  two  slopes  is  significant,  too.  This  finding  of more 
manipulation  across  the  board when  there  are  related  companies  is  what  one  would  expect. 
When we split this dummy into  two  dummies,  "parent"  and  "subsidiary",  both  are  significant. 
Finally,  the  coefficients  on  the  other  two  control  variables,  OCF/TA  and  EARN/TA,  are 
significant  and  their  signs  are  as  predicted,  in  both  the  income-decreasing  and  increasing 
subsamples. Table 8 confirms that these results are not due to misclassification. 
Table 8: Results from the sample of extreme fitted DA C (N=651) 
6.  Summary and discussion 
Prior  studies  have  focused  on  the  impact  of  governance  and  monitoring  mechanisms  on 
earnings  management  in  publicly  held  firms.  In  this  paper  we  formulate  hypotheses  on 
incentives  for,  and  constraints  on,  earnings  management  in  privately  held  continental-Earnings quality in privately held firms  page 15 
European  companies.  A  broad  sample  of industrial  and  commercial  privately  held  Belgian 
companies was used to test whether discretionary  accruals  management  is  influenced by  finns' 
relationships  with bankers,  suppliers,  employees  and  tax  authorities;  and  by  more  traditional 
internal  and  external  governance  mechanisms  such  as  the  board  of directors  and  external 
auditing. 
Confirming conventional wisdom in Belgium, we find clear evidence that privately held 
finns  decrease  earnings  for  tax  reasons.  Another  unambiguous  effect  is  that  financial 
stakeholders (banks and suppliers)  have  an  impact  on  earnings  management  by privately  held 
firms. In particular, we find that firms that rely to a  higher  extent  on  financial  or  commercial 
debt  are  detectably  more  moderate  in  their  income-decreasing  earnings  management.  Such 
income-decreasing earnings management is, similarly, less pronounced in the  year  before  finns 
raise  additional  financial  debt  on  non-public  capital  markets.  This  is  consistent  with  finns 
toning  down  tax  avoidance  to  please  crucial  stakeholders.  By  contrast,  we  do  not  find  that 
firms manage earnings to influence the terms of  trade  with  employees.  This  is  consistent  with 
earlier results of Liberty and Zimmerman (1986) and Konings, Labro and Roodhooft (1998). 
As  to  more  traditional  governance  mechanisms,  we  find  that  earnings  management, 
and  specifically  the  downward  version,  is  less  pronounced  in  firms  with  larger  boards. 
Somewhat  unexpectedly,  our  results  do  not  support  the  hypothesis  that  big-6  auditors 
constrain earnings management more than do non-big-6 auditors. This evidence  contrasts  with 
evidence on differences in earnings management between big-6  and non-big-6  clients  for  listed 
US  firms  (see  Becker et al.  1998,  Francis  et  al.  1999).  It  is  not  clear  what  explains  the 
difference with the US results. It  may be a consequence of the lower probability of detection  of 
an  audit failure,  for either  of the  following  reasons.  First,  financial  statements  of nonlisted 
finns  are  not  scrutinised  by  financial  analysts,  investors,  or  market  overseers.  Second,  the 
Belgian audit environment is  less  litigious,  which not  only  reduces  the  probability  that  audit 
failures  will  be  detected,  but  also  the  probability  that  the  auditor  will  indeed  incur  adverse 
effects of an audit failure. 
Other evidence as to audit-quality differentiation in the Belgian audit market  is  mixed. 
Gaeremynck  and  Willekens  (2002)  find  that  there  are  no  differences  as  to  audit  reporting 
between big-6 and other audit finns when problems in client firms are very obvious, but do fmd 
more stringent reporting by  big-6-auditees  when the  problems  in  client firms  are  more  subtle. page 16  Earnings quality in privately held firms 
Willekens  and Achmadi  (2002)  report fee  premia  for  big-6  auditors,  but  report  a  significant 
decrease  of these  premia  during  the  1990s.  Vander  Bauwhede,  Willekens  and  Gaeremynck 
(2001)  fmd  that big-6  auditors  do  constrain  income-decreasing  earnings  management  in  the 
large  nonlisted-client  segment  and  the  listed-client .segments  of the  Belgian  audit  market,  but 
they find no evidence that they constrain income-increasing earnings management. Earnings quality in privately held firms  page 17  . 
Appendix: Measurement of  Discretionary Accruals (DA C) 
We measure the extent of earnings  management through  discretionary  accruals.  Discretionary 
accruals  were  estimated  using  an  accruals  expectations  model.  From  the  literature,  existing 
accruals  expectations models  have  a low predictive  power.  We  have  started  from  the  Jones 
(1991)-Kasznik  (1999)  regression  but  have  substantially  improved  its  performance  by  adding 
lagged total accruals  as  a regressor.  That is,  we  estimate  the  following  accruals  expectations 
model, on all the year- and industry-specific records that were not randomly selected to be  part 
in  our  event  sample  (the  one  used  for  our  analysis  of  constraints  on  earnings 
management)  14, 15: 
TACi I  GPEi I  AdjRevi I  IJ.OCFi  I  TACi 1-1 
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where: 
TACU  = total accruals for firm i in industry j(i) and year t; 
TAU  =  total assets for firm i in industry j  in year t; 
GPEi,1  =  gross property plant and equipment for firm i in industry j  in year t; 
AdjRevi,1  =  change in revenues minus change in receivables for firm i in industry j  in  year 
t  , 
IlOCFi,1  = change in operating cash flow for firm i in industry j  in year t. 
Total  accruals  are  computed  as  working  capital  accruals  minus  depreciation.  Gross 
property plant and equipment is included in the accruals expectations model to account for  the 
part  of total  accruals  that  is  derived  from  depreciation  accruals,  while  change  in  revenues  is 
included to account for changes in working  capital  accruals  (Jones,  1991).  Change  in revenues 
is adjusted for change  in  accounts  receivables  to  account  for  the  fact  that  credit  sales  may be 
discretionary (Dechow et ai.,  1995). Change in cash flow from operations is included following 
Dechow et ai.  (1994)  who  report  that  this  variable  is  significantly  related  to  total  accruals 
(Kasznik, 1999). We included lagged total accruals because the  components  of prior  year  total 
accruals  may include  information  as  to  the  magnitude  of this  year's  total  accruals.  Including 
this variable is in line with Guay et  ai.  (1996),  who  argued  that  standard  accruals  expectations 
models  might be  enhanced  by  recognising  that  (some  of  the)  accruals  reverse  over  time. page 18  Earnings quality in  privately held firms 
Further, Beneish (1997)  also  proposed to  include  lagged total  accruals  in  order to respond to 
the  fact  that  the  current  accruals  expectation  model  (i.e.  the Modified Jones Model)  did  not 
seem to capture the accruals patterns that are observed in  firms  that were  identified to  violate 
GMP. Note that all the variables in our accrual  expectations model  are  scaled by lagged total 
assets  to  allow  for  any  heteroskedasticity  being  present  in  the  regression  in  levels  (Jones, 
1991).16 
The  sample  selection  is  described  in  Section  4.  Having  estimated  the  total-accruals 
model,  we  compute,  in  the  event  sample,  the  fitted  values,  to  be  interpreted  as  the  normal 
accruals for a firm with  the  same  characteristics.  Discretionary  accruals,  then,  are  the  out-of-
sample residuals. Appendix Table Al  reports  summary  statistics  on  the  estimated  coefficients 
of  discretionary  accruals.  The  explanatory  variables  are  generally  significant  and  have 
acceptable  signs.  The  explanatory  power-a  mean  (median)  adjusted  R-squared  of  0.7522 
(0.7639)-is  quite  satisfactory:  in  our  sample,  our regression's  R2  outperforms  the  Kasznik 
(1999)  equation  by  over  25  percent.  The  concomitant  reduction  of  estimation  error  in 
discretionary accruals should, in tum, increase the power of our tests  of earnings  management. 
Appendix  Table  A2  reports  summary  statistics  of  total  accruals,  and  the  estimated 
discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. 
1  For  example,  the  Cadbury  report  in  the  UK,  the  Vienot  report  in  France,  the  report  of the  Peters 
Commission in the Netherlands, and, in Belgium, the reports by the Government Commission on Corporate 
Governance and the Banking and Finance Commission. 
2Examples of studies of  differences between Big-N and other firms include 1)  as  to  audit fees  charged,  with 
higherfees for Big-N firms:  Simunic (1980),  Palrnrose  (1986a,b), Francis  and  Simon  (1987),  Gist  (1992), 
Craswell et al. (1995); 2) as to audit reports issued, with more qualifications (ceteris paribus) issued by big-
N firms:  Mutchler et al. (1996); Gaeremynck and Willekens (2002); 3) as to earnings management with  Big-
N firms constraining earnings management more: Becker et al. (1998) and Francis et al. (1999). 
3  A firm is obliged to prepare and publish financial statements in case of limited liability of the  owners.  The 
amount of detail in the financial information provided depends on the size of  the firm. If  the firms  meet two 
of the  following  criteria, total  assets> 3,125,000  Euro,  turnover>  6,250,000  Euro  and  the  number  of 
employees> 50, it qualifies  as  a 'large' firm  and then the full  version of the  financial  statements  is  to be 
submitted. Companies appointing more than 100 employees always classify as 'large' firms. 
4This  is  not  to  say  that there  are  no  other mechanisms  that  enforce  auditing  standards  in  Belgium:  the 
Institute of  Auditors may impose disciplinary sanctions, and an audit firm's reputation will still be damaged 
in  case  a violation  of the  auditing  standards  is  revealed.  Furthermore,  for  the  Big-N  firms  (which  are 
Belgium's largest auditors) the  standardised US-based audit methodologies and training programmes apply 
throughout the world. Earnings quality in privately held firms  page 19 
5Regarding the stakeholder-related incentives, Trueman and Titman (1988) merely predict higher levels  of 
earnings management, whether income-increasing or -decreasing, in companies that depend to a higher extent 
on financiers,  suppliers and employees.  Others (e.g.  Bowen et  ai.,  1995;  Burgstahler  and  Dichev,  1997; 
Liberty and Zimmennan,  1986)  predict  specific  directions:  they  expect more  income-increasing earnings 
management for finns that rely more on external financiers, need additional external finance and suppliers, 
and more income-decreasing earnings management for firms that depend more on  employees. We adopt that 
second, direction-specific approach. 
6Some claim though that a board should optimally include  8 to  12  directors.  The Belgian Committee on 
Corporate Governance decided that boards should not include more than  12  directors.  Lipton  and  Lorsch 
(1992) recommend that boards should not include more than 10 directors, and preferably only include  8 or 9 
directors. Prior studies on publicly held finns, report mean and medians that range between 7 and 12  board 
members.  In particular: Mean and median board size in Peasnell et ai.  1999  is  8;  and  mean and  median 
board size in Dechow et al.  1996 : 9 and 7 respectively. 
7  An assessment  of whether  external  auditing per se affects  a finn's earnings  management behaviour  is 
impossible as all finns in the sample have an auditor by law. 
8See for example Carpenter and Strawser (1971), Simunic (1980), Francis (1984), Palrnrose (1986), Francis 
and Simon  (1987),  Simunic and Stein (1987),  Francis and  Wilson  (1988),  Palrnrose  (1988),  Simon  and 
Francis (1988), DeFond (1992), Francis et ai.  (1999). 
9This is  true only when the means do  not differ substantially across the  samples.  A tell-tale symptom of 
this would be that the slopes of a pooled-sample regression is not in-between the slopes of the two separate 
regressions. This turned out to be no problem here. 
IOThe solution is,  conceptually, akin to  2SLSIIV,  where a regressor is replaced by its fitted value from an 
auxiliary regressor. Note also that, as the purpose of  the linear regression merely is to provide fitted variables 
that do a reasonable job in ranking the  true conditional expected values, it  is  not so  crucial that the fitted 
values are estimated inconsistently. 
lIThe NACE-code is an industry classification chart, comparable to the US SIC.  We do  not include finns in 
the rather deviant financial and insurance industries (NACE  code 8 ) and the overly heterogeneous lot that 
provide "other services" (NACE code 9). 
12it can be verified that generally the extremes sample produces similar results except that significance levels 
tend to be lower. The lower significance level could be  due  to  the halving of the sample size, a narrowing-
down of  the variance of  the regressors, or to a flattening-out of  the relation between DA C and X for very high 
or low X,  that is, a misspecification of the linear regression. 
13 True, board members get a profit share ("tantieme") which could provide an incentive to  increase profits. 
But in the absence of any separation between ownership and  control  and  any  tax  discrimination  between 
dividends  and tantieme,  dividends can be used equally well to reward the  board,  and  dividends  have  the 
advantage of  not messing up any earnings-management that may have been intended. 
14We refer to the (industry- and year-) specific samples as "the estimation samples", and the random sample 
used for the analysis of  constraints on earnings management as the "event sample". 
15Before estimation we deleted from the  estimation and event sample all  observations that were influential 
W.r.t. our accruals expectations model.  Influential observations were identified by  using  the  DFFITS  and 
COOK's distance measures. 
16Glesjer tests indicated that there was indeed a heteroscedasticity problem, and that lagged total assets were 
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Table 1. Overview of hypotheses 
Incentives (stakeholder-related) 
•  Tax-incentive hypothesis: The firm always has an  incentive  to  manage  earnings  downward, 
but especially so when there are no loss carry-overs. 
•  Wage-cost  incentive  hypothesis:  To  stave  off demands  for  higher  wages,  the  firm  has  an 
incentive  to  manage  earnings  downward.  This  incentive  is  stronger  when  there  are  more 
employees and when there is a works council. 
Trade-credit incentive hypothesis: To preserve  or  improve  trade-credit  terms,  the  firm  has 
an  incentive  to  manage  earnings  upward.  This  incentive  is  stronger,  the  more  important 
trade credit is. 
• Interest-cost incentive hypothesis: To keep down  the  cost of rolled-over  or new  loans,  the 
firm  has  an  incentive  to  manage  earnings  upward.  This  incentive  is  stronger,  the  more 
important loans are and when borrowing is to be increased in the near future. 
Restraining factors 
•  monitoring  effect  of stakeholders  hypothesis:  to  avoid  the  cost  of a  loss  of trust  and 
reputation that follow upon detection of earnings  management  by  a  stakeholder,  firms  tend 
to avoid such management the more they depend on stakeholders, e.g. 
•  when there are more employees and when there is a works council 
•  the more important credit is 
•  the more important loans are or when borrowing is to be increased. 
monitoring effect of  governance structures hypothesis: the firm tends to practice less earning 
management, 
•  the smaller its board is, 
•  if  the auditor is a big-N company Earnings quality in  privately held (irms  page 25 
Table 2: Model specification and variable measurement 
main test variable definition  Incentive  1  Restraint  1 
hypothesis  hypothesis, 
l
'i------r- D - umm -- y -,-=-I-if-cl-ie-n-t-fi-rm--i-p -a-i-d-t-ax-es-in-t---l-,  -=-O-r--;-A"-l<-K-l-<-:O::-'I  Al<O,  Kl>  1 
I(TAXi,!)  otherwise  (avoidance)  (smoothing) 
~1-----~I-D-umm--y-,-=-I-i-f-th-e-c-I-ie-n-t-fi-nn-'-h-a-v-m-g--~-1-0-0~-~A-2-<-K-2<-O-'1  A2<O,K2>  I' 
, 1(1 OOEmpli,!) ,_e_m_p::..I_o.:..y_ee_s-,-,_h_a_s _a_w_o_r_k_s_c_o_Ull_c_i_I;_=_O_0_th_e_rw_i_se  ___ 
1i
____ (monitoring)  , 
l
AP  1  Amount of  commercial debt over  initial  total  assets  O<'A3<K3 1 A3<O,  K3>O  I' 
7'  A  i,t  of client firm i in year t  (monitoring) 
I
'  ~;~~~t  I'  Amount of financial debt over  initial  total  assets  of  O<A4<K4 1 A4<O,  K4>O  I' 
TAi,t-I  client i in year t  (monitoring) 
I
, I(WinDi,t)  I'  Dummy,  =  1 if client  i's  financial  debt  increases  I'  O<'A4<K4  1 A5<O, K5>0  1 
between years t and t+ I, = 0 otherwise  (monitoring) 
Ln(BSizei,t) 
Natural  logarithm  of number  of  directors  on  the  - size=expertise: 
board of client firm i in year t  A6<O,K6>O 
big=inefficient: 
A6>O, K6< 0 
Dummy,  =1  when  the  audit finn  of client  finn  i in I  I  A7<O, K7>0 
_y_e_a_r_t_i_s _a_b_ig'--_6_a_u_d_it_o_r;_=_0_o_th_e_rw_is_e ______  r--___  , (monitoring) 
control variable definition  I  hypothesis 
I(GROUP;,t)  Dummy, = 1 if client  firm  i  in  year t  reports  it  has  A8<O,  K8>O  financial  assets  in  an  affiliated  company  and!  or 
reports  receivables  from  or  debt  to  an  affiliated 
company 
1 
OCFi t  1 Operating cash flow of client finn  i  in year t scaled 1  A9<O,  K9<O 
,  TAi,t-I  by lagged total assets  (Dechow et ai"  1995) 
I
-E-A-RN-'--i-t--I'  Earnings  before  taxes  of finn  i  in  year  t  scaled by I  AlO>O, KIO>O 
,  TAi,t-I  lagged total assets  _(D_ec_h_o_w_et_a_I_,,_1_9_9_5_)_! 
Table 3: Sample Selection Procedure 
Random Sample from Total Population  3137 
Firm-years without auditor data or of firms that changed auditors  -963 
Firm-years of  publicly held companies  -15 
Firm-years whose industry- and year-matched portfolios had less than 50 obs  -613 
Firm-years with missing data for discretionary accruals calculation  -126 
Firm-years with missing data for variables of explanatory regression  -118 
Remaining number of firm-years  1302 
Whereof  Number of firms in year 1994  344 
Number of finns in year 1995  517 
Number of finns in year 1996  441 
Number of  firms with one year of data  99 
Number of  firms with two years of data  249 
Number of  firms with three years of data  235 
Total number of firms  583 page 26  Earnings quality in privately held firms 
Table 4: Industry classification of  firm-year observations 
I- N=A=C=E~  ___  ~~~~~~-4_N~A~C~E  ______  ~~D~e~s~cr~i~Pt~io~n~  _________  #~fi~lnn~-__  '#finns I  Code  Code  (2-digit level)  years 
2  Chemical industry  24  Manufacture  of  non-metallic  55  21  I 













25  Chemical industry  37  18  I 
31  Manufacture of  metal articles  42  25  I 
32  Mechanical engineering 
~  Electrical engineering 
41  Food  drink  and  Tobacco 
industry 
42  Food  drink  and  Tobacco 
industry 
43  Textile industry 
45  Leather industry 
46  Timber  and  wooden  furniture 
industries 
47  Manufacture of paper and  paper 
products,  rinting and publishing 
48  Processing of  rubber and plastics 
50  General building and engineering 
61  Wholesale distribution 
63  Agents 
64  Retail distribution 
66  Hotels and catering 
67  Repair  of consumer  goods  and 



























5  Retail distribution 
,  ____________________  v_eh_i..:.cl_e_s ______________________________  ., 
Transport and  I 72  Other (than railway) transport 
communication 
~.  Supporting services to transport 
I 
77  Travel  agents  and  agents 
facilitating  transport,  storage 
and warehousing 
53  23 
10  4 
64  27 
Total  I  1302  583 
--------------~---------------------------~-----""'~~ Earnings quality in privately held firms  page 27 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics on the variables of our explanatory modela 
I  Variable  N  Mean  St.Dev.  Min.  QI  Median  Q3  Max  I 
IDACSIGN  1302  0.457  0.498  0  0  0  I  1 
I~Aq  1302  0.049  0.055  0.000  0.014  0.031  0.066  0.571  1 
1  FinDITA  1302  0.173  0.191  0  0.001  0.103  0.306  0.920  1 
1  MinD  1302  0.484  0.500  0  0  0  1  1 
1  APITA  1  1302  0.282  0.205  0  0.132  0.242  0.381  0.988  1 
1  J(1OOEmpl)1  1302  0.279  0.449  0  0  0  1  1 
IJ(TAX)  1  1302  0.713  0.452  0  0  1  1  1 
ILNBSize  1  1302  1.299  0.336  0  1.098  1.098  1.386  2.565  1 
1  BSize  1  1302  3.890  1.541  1  3  3  4  13  1 
IJ(Big6)  1  1302  0.372  0.483  0  0  0  1  1 
IJ(GROUP)  1  1302  0.732  0.443  0  0  1 
IOCFITA  1  1302  0.077  0.196  -1.255  -0.019  0.067  0.152  1 
IEARNITA  I 1302  0.052  0.115  -0.407  0.002  0.029  0.094  1.140  I 
DACSIGN =  dummy that takes the value  I if discretionary accruals  are positive and 0 when discretionary 
accruals are negative; BSize = number of directors on the board; for other variable definitions, see Table 3. 
Table 6: Results from the full sample (N=1302) 
·1  I·  Negative-DAC sUbsarnPle·1  Positive-DAC subsample  I·  difference between  I· 
(Nl =  707)  (N2 =  595)  estimates, negative- v 
positive-DAC subsamples 
I  va~~ble I est~~ate  .  p-~;~ue  I Est:~ate  .  p-~;~ue  Est:~ate·  p-~;~ue  I 
1 Intercept  1  -0.0637  <0.0001"'1  0.0560  <0.0001'"  0.1197  <0.0001"'1 
1 J(TAX)  1  -0.0091  0.0556'  1  -0.0281  0.0001'"  -0.0190  0.0156'*  1 
1 J(100emp)  1  0.0013  0.3733  1  0.0029  0.2732  0.0016  0.3988  1 
1 APITA  1  0.0247  0.0049*"  1  -0.0111  0.1532  -0.0358  0.0062**' 1 
1 FinDITA  1  0.0365  0.0006"  1  0.0001  0.4988  -0.0365  0.0169*'  1 
1 J(MinD)  1  0.0068  0.0335**  1  0.0008  0.4156  -0.0059  0.1331  1 
Iln(BSize)  1  0.0136  0.0130**  1  -0.0065  0.1272  -0.0201  0.0082*"1 
1 J(Big6)  1  -0.0020  0.3176  1  0.0018  0.3533  0.0037  0.2755  1 
1 J(GROUP)  1  -0.0133  0.0003**'1  0.0073  0.0459'  0.0206  0.0002"*1 
IOCFITA  1  -0.1034  <0.0001**'1  -0.1159  <0.0001*"  -0.0125  0.3451  1 
I  EARNITA  I  0.2620  <0.0001***,  0.2616  <0.0001*"  -0.0004  0.4976  I 
F-value 77.6100, p-value 0.0001, R2adj  = 0.5529 
Variables are defined in Table 2.  p-values  in  (3)  and  (5)  are  one-sided,  those  in  (7)  two-sided.  All  are  computed 
using the White heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix (White 1980). 
**' significant at I % level; ,.  significant at 5 % level; * significant at 10 % level. page 28  Earnings quality in privately held firms 
Table 7: Correlation matrix for explanatory variables in our basic model 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N  = 1302;  Prob>lrl under HO: p=O 
i  Big6  LNBSize  FinDITA  APITA  J(MinD)l(100Empl)  J(TAX) J(GROUP)  OCFITA 
1  LNBSize 
I 
1  FinDITA 
I 
0.00023  1.00000 
0.9933 
0.01111  0.01560  1.00000 
0.6888  0.5737 
1  APITA  0.08132  -0.06622 -0.21553  1.00000 
I  0.0033  0.0169  <.0001 
IJ(MinD)  -0.05102  0.04761  0.12600  -0.00213  1.00000 
I  0.0657  0.0859  <.0001  0.9387 
IJ(100Empl) 0.00145  -0.06321  0.01344- 0.04899  -0.01510 
I  0.9584  0.0226  0.6280  0.0772  0.5863 
IJ(TAX)  -0.04588  0.08753  -0.22328  0.02385  -0.03817 
I  0.0980  0.0016  <.0001  0.3899  0.1687 
1.00000 
0.06162  1.00000 
0.0262 
IJ(GROUP)  0.34790  0.14451  0.01319  -0.00948  -0.03074  0.04857  -0.01144  1.00000 
I  <.0001  <.0001  0.6344  0.7326  0.2676  0.0798  0.6801 
IOCFITA  -0.03002  0.00565  -0.29128  0.00250  -0.05845  0.02223  0.19768  0.00010  1.00000 
I  0.2791  0.8385  <.0001  0.9282  0.0349  0.4229  <.0001  0.9970 
1  EARNITA  0.04955  0.00515  -0.28258  -0.08181  -0.13262  0.05870  0.29393  0.01597  0.52706 
!  0.0739  0.8526  <.0001  0.0031  <.0001  0.0342  <.0001  0.5648  <.0001 














Negative-DAC  I'  Positive-DAC subsarnple 
subsample (Nl =  326)  (N2 =  325) 
estimate  p-value  ,.  Estimate  p-value 
(2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
-0.0528  0.0001 *** 1  0.0471  0.0010*** 
-0.0200  0.0230**  1 -0.0278  0.0149'* 
0.0036  0.2802  1 -0.0021  0.7834 
0.0127  0.2103  1 -0.0099  0.6310 
0.0598  0.0069*** 1 -0.0072  0.3529 
0.0033  0.3089  1  0.0025  0.3477 
0.0150  0.0885*'  1 -0.0026  0.7890 
0.0040  0.2721  1  0.0023  0.3755 
-0.0134  0.0829**  1  0.0066  0.4414 
-0.1452  0.0001 *.* 1 -0.1465  0.0005*** 
0.4442  0.0001"'1  0.3142  0.0004**' 
difference between  1 
estimates, negative- v 
positive-DAC subsamples 
Estimate  .  p-value  I· 
(6)  (7) 
-0.0999  0.0001"'1 










0.2806  1 
0.1920  1 
0.0152"  1 
0.4644  1 







0.1652  I 
F-value 46.37, p-value 0.0001, R2adj =  0.5944 
The regression is run on the observations corresponding to the 25% highest and  lowest  of the  fitted  values  from 
the full-sample regression (Table 6). Variables are defined in Table 2. p-values in (3)  and  (5)  are  one-sided,  those 
in  (7)  two-sided.  All  are  computed  using  the  White  heteroskedasticity-consistent  covariance  matrix  (White 
1980)  . 
•  ** significant at 1 % level; •• significant at 5 % level; • significant at 10 % level. Earnings quality in privately held firms  page 29 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics of the year- and industry- specific OLS estimation 
of the accruals expectations model on the estimation sample 
TACu _  RO'(')  + RI'(')  GPEU + R2'(')  AdjRevu + R3 .(.)  tlOCFu + R4'(')  TACu-l + E' 
TAi,t-l - I-'  :J  I,t  I-'} I  ,t TAi,t-l  I-':J I,t  TAi,t-l  I-'  :J  I  ,t  TAi,t-l  I-'  J l,t TAi,t-l  It 
with  TACi,t= total accruals for finn i  in industry j(i) and year t;  TAU  =  total  assets  for  finn  i  in 
industry  j  in year t;  GPEi,t = gross property plant and equipment for finn i  in industry j  in year  t~ 
ADJREVi,t  =  change  in  revenues  minus  change  in  receivables for  finn  i  in  industry j  in  year  t; 
tlOCFi,t =  change in operating cash flow for finn i in industry j in year t. 
I  N  Mean  Median  St. Dev.  Min  QI  Q3  Max  % Pos. 
Ibo  66  0.001  0.002  0.014  -0.036  -0.007  0.011  0.01  56.06 
It-stat  66  0.252  0.234  1.413  -2.710  -0.784  1.107  5.341 
Ib1  66  -0.017  -0.018  0.015  -0.049  -0.027  -0.006  0.008  7.55 
It-stat  66  -1.701  -1.459  1.527  -5.060  -2.986  -0.606  1.867 
Ib2  66  0.020  0.016  0.028  -0.049  0.004  0.039  0.153  84.85 
It-stat  66  1.286  1.296  1.493  -2.270  0.326  2.036  5.300 
Ib3  66  -0.731  -0.737  0.105  -0.970  -0.788  -0.671  -0.268  0 
It-stat  66  -23.623  -19.253  14.274  -87.110  -26.255  -15.542  -7.540 
1b4  66  0.701  0.709  0.116  0.267  0.644  0.774  0.963  100 
It-stat  66  20.133  16.979  13.956  3.431  13.110  23.449  85.860 
INobs  66  251.480  155.500  426.970  50.000  107.250  202.750  2392.00 
ladj R2  66  0.752  0.764  0.106  0.2892  0.697  0.814  0.971 
Ip-value ofl  66  0.297  0.277  0.214  0.0001  0.116  0.427  0.892 
White test 
Table A2: Descriptive statistics on total accruals, discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals for the event sample 
I  N  Mean  st. dev.  Var.  Min.  Q1  Median  Q3  Max 
I  TAC  1554  -0.045  0.164  0.027  -2.086  -0.118  -0.043  0.030  1.101 
I  NAC  1554  -0.042  0.142  0.020  -1.862  -0.108  -0.041  0.026  0.164 
I  DAC  1554  -0.004  0.077  0.006  -0.413  -0.038  -0.003  0.029  0.571  ._-_. 
TAC = Total accruals; NAC = non-discretionary accruals, the out-of-sample fitted values from the regression 
estimated in table 3; DAC = TAC - NAC = discretionary accruals, the out-of-sample residuals. 